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This paper reconsiders implementation of social choice functions defined as mapping 
from states to consequences, where we require the uniqueness of equilibrium outcome at 
every state. In contrast with the standard models, we construct only mechanisms that are 
universal, i.e., are free from the detail of the model specification such as the set of states, 
and allow each agent to have small moral preference. We show that a single mechanism can 
implement every incentive compatible social choice function. Moral preferences serve not 
only to eliminate unwanted equilibria but also to make the central planner’s information 
processing simplified as much as possible in ways that each agent will translate her 
indescribable private signal into the describable characteristic of the socially optimal 
alternative. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper demonstrates a new approach to the implementation problem, where a 
social choice function defined as a mapping from states to consequences is said to be 
implementable in terms of any equilibrium concept if we can construct a mechanism in 
which at every state there exists the unique equilibrium outcome and this outcome equals 
the value of the social choice function. The mechanisms used in the previous works in the 
implementation literature depended crucially on the very detail of the model specification 
such as the set of states. In real situations, however, it might be impossible to describe this 
detail on a document, because of its complexity. Hence, transaction-cost economists 
sometimes criticize implementation theory, because the constructed mechanisms are 
difficult to put into practice.
1 Based on this observation, this paper reconsiders the 
implementation problem by investigating the possibility that a single mechanism, which is 
universal, i.e., is not tailored to any particular model specification, can implement a wide 
variety of social choice functions. 
This paper considers the following public decision procedure with complete 
information, where which alternative is socially optimal is common knowledge among 
agents but is unknown to the central planner. The central planner requires each agent to 
make multiple announcements about which alternative is to be recommended as the public 
decision. The central planner then randomly picks up a message profile from their multiple 
announcements. If sufficiently many agents announce the same alternative that is 
enforceable by the central planner, then the central planner will decide on it. Otherwise, the 
central planner will decide on the status quo alternative. Here, we assume that it is 
verifiable to the court whether the recommendations by agents are enforceable or not. This 
procedure does not depend on the set of states, and therefore, we do not require the set of 
states to be describable. 
Unfortunately, any mechanism based on this procedure fails to work in the standard 
models of implementation, where each agent is assumed to have preference only for 
consequences. See Moore (1992), Palfrey (1992), and Maskin and Sjostrom (2002) for the 
surveys of the standard models of implementation.
2 Maskin and Tirole (1999) and Tirole 
(1999) argued that if a social choice function is implementable in Nash equilibrium or any 
other equilibrium concept with complete information, then any factors of the state other 
than agents’ preferences on which the social choice function depends must be known to the 
central planner, describable on a document, and verifiable to the court. On the other hand, 
there exist many important attempts to establish ideas on the theoretical foundations of 
social choice and welfare such as Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981), and Sen (1982, 1985, 
1999), all of which are based on their respective ethical factors of the state other than 
                                                 
1 For the surveys on transaction-cost economics and incomplete contract theory, see Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992) and Hart (1995). 
2 Eliaz (2002) took into account factors other than individuals’ preferences for consequences such 
as bounded rationality. Glazer and Rubinstein (1998) allowed agents to have non-consequentialist 
preferences.   3
individuals’ preferences for consequences.
3  The relevance of these factors to social choice 
and welfare might be too complicated to be described on a document. In order to verify 
which alternative is to be socially optimal, however, it might be necessary for the central 
planner to describe this relevance. Hence, we can conclude that ethically important social 
choice functions are never implementable in the standard models of implementation.
4 In 
order to implement them, it might be inevitable to take into account the possibility that 
agents have preferences not only for consequences but also for anything non-consequential. 
Based on this observation, this paper will assume that some agents have moral 
preferences in a sense that they have positive psychological costs for recommending any 
alternative other than the socially optimal alternative. Several works such as Erard and 
Feinstein (1994), Alger and Ma (2003), and Deneckere and Severinov (2001) examined the 
case that agents’ ability to manipulate information is limited and demonstrated that 
including agents who have preference for honesty could significantly alter the model. These 
works assumed that the cost for reporting dishonestly is sufficiently large, while the present 
paper will allow the maximal total cost for immorality to be as close to zero as possible. 
The results of this paper are very permissive. In particular, we show that there exists a 
single mechanism with small fines that implements any social choice function in iterative 
dominance whenever at least one agent has moral preference. Here, we do not even require 
the set of alternatives to be describable. All we have to require is that at every state the 
value of the social choice function and the status quo alternative are describable. This point 
is in contrast with the standard models of implementation, where in order to eliminate 
unwanted equilibria the central planner has to incentivize agents to announce mostly full 
information about their preference profile honestly. This inevitably requires the set of 
alternatives to be describable. Hence, agents’ moral preferences will play a powerful role in 
making the central planner’s information processing simplified as much as possible. 
We will extend the above arguments to the incomplete information environments, 
where an alternative is defined as a bundle of characteristics, and every describable 
alternative is assumed to be enforceable. Each agent receives her private signal that has 
partial information about the characteristics of the socially optimal alternative. A state is 
defined as a profile of agents’ private signals. We assume that each characteristic of the 
socially optimal alternative is known to at least one agent. Hence, a social choice function 
is described by a profile of mappings from private signals to profiles of characteristics. 
We consider the following public decision procedure. The central planner requires 
each agent to make multiple announcements about what the true characteristics of the 
socially optimal alternative are. The central planner then randomly picks up a message 
profile from their multiple announcements as the alternative that agents jointly recommend, 
                                                 
3 Rawls introduced primary goods. Dworkin introduced compensation and responsibility. Sen 
introduced liberty, functioning, and capabilities. See Basu, Pattanaik, and Suzumura (1995), Sen 
(1999), and Suzumura (2002) for the surveys on social choice and welfare. 
4 Moreover, Serrano and Vohra (2001) investigated the economic environments with incomplete 
information where agents’ preferences are the same across states but their initial endowments 
depend on the state. They showed that no individually rational social choice function is 
implementable.   4
and will decide on it. This procedure does not depend on the set of states, and therefore, we 
do not require the set of states to be describable. 
Similarly to the complete information environments, we assume that all agents have 
moral preferences in a sense that they have positive psychological costs for making 
dishonest announcements about the characteristics of the socially optimal alternative. Their 
costs can be as close to zero as possible. We then show that there exists a single mechanism 
with small fines that implements any social choice function in Bayesian iterative dominance 
with respect to any probability structure if this social choice function and this probability 
structure satisfy incentive compatibility associated with agents’ psychological costs. 
In general, as agents’ psychological costs become large, the incentive compatibility 
constraint becomes weaker, and therefore, the range of implementable social choice 
functions expands. Even if their costs are close to zero, their moral preferences will play the 
significant role in eliminating unwanted equilibria. In fact, in the standard models incentive 
compatibility is not sufficient for implementability in terms of any equilibrium concept 
with incomplete information
5, while it is sufficient in our model. Agents’ moral preferences 
also serve to make the central planner free from any complicated information processing 
because each agent is well incentivized to translate her private signal that may be 
indescribable into the characteristics of the socially optimal alternative that are describable. 
This will be the driving force of making the mechanism free from the detail of the model 
specification. In particular, the mechanisms is independent of the probability structure, as 
well as of the social choice function. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 shows the basic model with 
complete information. Section 3 considers the case where each agent makes only a single 
announcement. We show that with five or more agents there exists a mechanism with no 
fine that implements any alternative in pure strategy Nash equilibrium if all agents regard it 
as being socially optimal and a majority of the agents prefer it to agent 1’s most favorite 
alternative. Sections 4 and 5 consider the case where each agent makes multiple 
announcements. Section 4 supposes that at least one agent has moral preference in a 
minimal sense that whenever the other agents recommend only the socially optimal 
alternative then she has positive psychological cost for immorality. We show that with four 
agents there exists a mechanism with small fines that implements any alternative in pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium if this agent regards it as being socially optimal. We argue that 
this result holds even if no agent has moral preference. Section 5 supposes that at least one 
agent has moral preference in the original sense. We show that with three agents there 
exists a mechanism with small fines that implements any alternative in iterative dominance 
if this agent regards it as being socially optimal. Section 6 explains the implications of the 
above results in the implementation literature. Section 7 investigates the incomplete 
information environments, and shows the possibility result by constructing mechanisms 
with small fines and multiple announcements. 
                                                 
5 See Jackson (1991), Abreu and Matsushima (1992b), Matsushima (1993), Duggan (1997), 
Serrano and Vohra (2000), and others.   5
2. Basic Model 
 
Let  } ,..., 1 { n N =  denote the set of agents where  2 ≥ n . Let  A denote the set of 
alternatives. We may assume for a while that  A is describable on a document and 
enforceable by the central planner. As we will argue later, however, our results do not 
depend on this assumption. Let  ∆ denote the set of simple lotteries over alternatives. Let 




i M M  denote the set of 
message profiles. 
Fix a positive real number  0 > ε   arbitrarily. Given the set of message profiles  M , a 
mechanism is defined by  ) , ( t x G = , where  ∆ → M x: ,  N i i t t ∈ = ) (,  ) , [ : ∞ − → ε M ti , and 
t satisfies the budgetary constraint in the sense that  0 ) ( ≤ ∑
∈N i
i m t  for all  M m∈ . When 
the agents announce a message profile  M m m N i i ∈ = ∈ ) ( , the central planner will choose an 
alternative according to the lottery  ∆ ∈ ) (m x   and make a monetary transfer 
) , [ ) ( ∞ − ∈ ε m ti  to  each  agent  N i∈ . We regard  ε  as  the  upper bound of monetary fines. 
We write  a m x = ) ( i f   1 ) )( ( = a m x . 
A  utility function for each agent  N i∈  is defined by  R M R A ui → × × :,  w h e r e  
) , , ( m t a u i i  denotes agent  s i'  utility when the agents announce the message profile 
M m∈  and the central planner chooses the alternative  A a∈  and makes the monetary 
transfer  R ti ∈  to agent i . Here, we will allow the agents’ announcements to have 
intrinsic value for each agent’s welfare. We assume the expected utility hypothesis with 




i i i i a m t a u m t u ) ( ) , , ( ) , , ( α α , where 
Γ is the support of α . Denote  ) , 0 , ( ) , ( m u m u i i α α = . Let  N i i u u ∈ = ) (  denote a utility 
function profile. 
A message profile  M m∈  is said to be a Nash equilibrium in the game defined by 
) , ( u G   if for every  N i∈  and  every  i i M m ∈ ′ , 
    ) , ), , ( ), , ( ( ) ), ( ), ( ( i i i i i i i i i i m m m m t m m x u m m t m x u − − − ′ ′ ′ ≥ . 
An alternative  A a ∈
*   is said to be implemented in Nash equilibrium by a mechanism  G  
with respect to a utility function profile u   if there exists the unique Nash equilibrium 
M m∈  in  ) , ( u G , and this message profile satisfies 
   
* ) ( a m x = , and  0 ) ( = m ti  for  all  N i∈ . 
For every  N i∈ , let  i
u G
i M M =
) , , 0 ( . Recursively, for every  N i∈  and every 
,... 2 , 1 = r , let 




− ⊂  denote the set of messages 
) , , 1 ( u G r
i i M m
− ∈  for agent i 
such that there exists no 
) , , 1 ( u G r
i i M m
− ∈ ′   satisfying that for every 
) , , 1 ( u G r
i i M m
−
− − ∈ , 
















u G r M M





) , , ( ) , , (
r
u G r u G M M . A 
message profile  M m∈   is said to be iteratively undominated in the game  ) , ( u G   if 
) , , ( u G M m
∞ ∈ . 
An alternative  A a ∈
*  is said to be implemented in iterative dominance by a mechanism 
G  with respect to a utility function profile u   if there exists the unique iteratively 
undominated message profile  m  in  ) , ( u G , and this message profile satisfies 
* ) ( a m x = , and  0 ) ( = m ti  for  all  N i∈ . 
Here, implementation in Nash equilibrium does not imply the uniqueness of mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium, whereas implementation in iterative dominance implies this uniqueness. 
In this paper except for in Subsection 6.2, we will assume that for every  N i∈ , there 
exists a positive integer  0 > i K  such  that 
   
i K
i A M = . 
Hence, the central planner will require each agent  N i∈  to make  i K  announcements 
about which alternative to be recommended as the public decision.




i i M m m
i ∈ = =1 ) (.  
Fix an alternative  A a ∈
*   arbitrarily, which is regarded as the socially optimal alternative. 
Let  M m ∈
*   denote the message profile such that for every  N i∈  and  every 
} ,..., 1 { i K h∈ , 
   
* * a m
h
i = , 
where each agent recommends only the socially optimal alternative 
* a . 
In this paper except for in Subsection 6.2, we will confine our attentions to utility 
functions  i u  for each agent  N i∈  where there exist a function  R A vi → : , a positive 
real number  0 > i c , and a function  ] 1 , 0 [ : → M ri  such  that 
    i i i i i i c m r t a v m t a u ) ( ) ( ) , , ( − + =  for  all  A a∈ , all  R ti ∈ , and all  M m∈ , 
and 
    0 ) , (
* = −i i i m m r  for  all  i i M m − − ∈  
are satisfied. We regard  i c  as the upper bound of agent  s i'  psychological cost for 
recommending any alternatives other than the socially optimal alternative 
* a , which is 
caused by her moral sentiment. Each agent has no such cost received if she announces only 
the socially optimal alternative.
7 The function  ) (⋅ i v  is regarded as agent  s i'  preference 
for consequences. The mechanisms constructed in this paper will not much depend on how 
                                                 
6 Each agent simultaneously announces multiple messages at once. This may exclude any 
complexity of agents’ psychological interaction observed in laboratory experiments. See Fehr and 
Schmidt (2003). 
7 We assume quasi-linearity and risk neutrality for simplicity of arguments. We can drop this 
assumption with only minor changes.   7
to specify  N i i v ∈ ⋅)) ( ( . This point is in contrast with the standard models of implementation 
where the construction of mechanism is tailored to particular specifications of  N i i v ∈ ⋅)) ( (.  
   8
3. Single Recommendation with No Fines 
 
This section assumes that  5 ≥ n ,  n is  odd,
8 and  1 = i K  for  all  N i∈ , i.e., 
A M i =  for  all  N i∈ . 
Hence, each agent makes a single announcement about which alternative to be 
recommended. This section assumes that no fines are available. 
We specify a mechanism  ) , (
* * * t x G =  as follows, where  0 ) (
* = m ti  for all  N i∈  
and all  M m∈ . Fix  M m∈   arbitrarily. If there exists  A a∈  such  that 
a mi =   for at least 
2
1 + n
 agents  } 1 /{ N i∈   other than agent 1, 
then 
    a m x = ) (
* . 
If there exists  } /{ 1 m A a∈  such  that 
} , { 1 m a mi ∈  for  all  N i∈ , 
a mi =  for 
2
1 − n
 agents  } 1 /{ N i∈ , 
and 
1 m mi =  for 
2
1 − n
 agents  } 1 /{ N i∈ , 
then 
    a m x = ) (
* . 
Otherwise, 
    1
* ) ( m m x = . 
The central planner will regard agent 1 as the dictator with the following restrictions. 
If there is an alternative that is recommended by a majority of the agents other than agent 1, 
then the central planner will choose this alternative. If just 
2
1 − n
  agents other than agent 1 
recommend the same alternative and all other agents agree with agent 1, then the central 
planner will choose this alternative.
9 Otherwise, the central planner will choose the 
alternative that agent 1 recommends. 
For every  A a ∈
* , we define  ) (
* * a U  as the set of utility function profiles u  
satisfying the following three properties. 
 
(i)  For every  N i∈  and  every  M m∈ , if 
* a mi ≠ , then 
                                                 
8  With minor changes, we can apply the argument of this section to the case where  n  is  even. 
9 Hence, 
* G  cannot be regarded as being majority-based in that whenever there is an alternative 
recommended by a majority of agents then the central planner will choose this alternative. 
   9
1 ) ( = m ri . 
(ii)   There  exists  A a ∈
1  such  that 
    ) ( ) ( 1 1
1
1 a v c a v > −  for  all  } , /{
* 1 a a A a∈ . 
(iii)    There exist at least 
2
1 + n
 agents  } 1 /{ N i∈  such  that 
    i i i c a v a v − > ) ( ) (
1 * . 
 
Property (i) implies that every agent has moral preference in the sense that she prefers the 
announcement of the socially optimal alternative to any other announcement whenever the 
alternative and monetary transfer are unchanged. Note that for every  N i∈ , every  A a∈ , 
every  R ti ∈ , and every  M m∈ , 
    i i i i t a v m t a u + = ) ( ) , , ( i f  
* a mi = , 
and 
i i i i i c t a v m t a u − + = ) ( ) , , ( i f  
* a mi ≠ . 
Property (ii) implies that 
1 a  is regarded as agent 1’s most favorite alternative except for 
* a  at the expense of the cost  1 c . Property (iii) implies that 
* a  is preferred to 
1 a  by a 
majority of agents. 
 
Theorem 1:  Any alternative  A a ∈
*  is implemented in Nash equilibrium by 
* G  with 
respect to all  ) (
* * a U u∈ . 
 
Proof: Note that 
   
* * * ) ( a m x = . 
It is clear from  5 ≥ n  that 
* m   is a Nash equilibrium in  ) , (
* u G , because for every  N i∈  
and every  } /{
*
i i i m M m ∈ , 
   
* * * ) , ( a m m x i i = − , 
and therefore, it follows from property (i) that 
    ) , ), , ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ), ( (
* * * * * * * *
i i i i i i i i i m m m m x u c a v a v m m x u − − = − > = . 
 Fix  } /{ ˆ
* m M m∈  arbitrarily, and suppose that  m ˆ  is a Nash equilibrium in  ) , (
* u G . 
Suppose 
* * ) ˆ ( a m x = . Then, for every  } 1 /{ N i∈ , 
  
* * * ) ˆ , ( a m m x i i = − , 
and therefore, it follows from property (i) that if 
* ˆ a mi ≠ , then 
    ) ˆ , ), ˆ , ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆ ), ˆ ( (
* * * * * *
i i i i i i i i i m m m m x u a v c a v m m x u − − = < − = . 
Hence, it must hold that 
* ˆ a mi =  for all  } 1 /{ N i∈ , but 
*
1 ˆ a m ≠ . This contradicts the 
Nash equilibrium property, because agent 1 has incentive to announce 
* a  instead of  1 ˆ m . 
Hence, without loss of generality, we will assume   10
* * ) ˆ ( a m x ≠ . 
  First, suppose that there exist at least 
2
1 + n
 agents  } 1 /{ N i∈  such  that 
) ˆ ( ˆ
* m x mi = . 
Then, every agent who announces neither  ) ˆ (
* m x  nor 
* a  has incentive to announce 
* a  
because of property (i), i.e., because for every  N i∈ , if  } ), ˆ ( { ˆ
* * a m x mi ∉ , then 
   ) ˆ ( ) ˆ , (
* * * m x m m x i i = − , 
and therefore, 
)) ˆ ( ( )) ˆ ( ( ) ˆ ), ˆ ( (
* * * m x v c m x v m m x u i i i i < − = ) ˆ , ), ˆ , ( (
* * *
i i i i i m m m m x u − − = . 
This contradicts the Nash equilibrium property. Hence, it must hold that 
} ), ˆ ( { ˆ
* * a m x mi ∈  for  all  N i∈ . 
Note that agent 1 has incentive to announce 
* a   because of property (i) and 





* m x m m x = − . Hence, it must hold that 
*
1 ˆ a m = . Note that for every  } 1 /{ N i∈ , 
) ˆ ( ) ˆ , (
* * * m x m m x i i = − , and therefore, it follows from property (i) that each agent  } 1 /{ N i∈  
has incentive to announce 
* a . This contradicts the Nash equilibrium property. 
Next, suppose that 
} , ˆ { ) ˆ (
*
1
* a m m x ∉ , 
) ˆ ( ˆ
* m x mi =  for 
2
1 − n
 agents  } 1 /{ N i∈ , 
and 
1 ˆ ˆ m mi =  for 
2
1 − n
 agents  } 1 /{ N i∈ . 
Then, agent 1 is regarded as being dictatorial in the sense that for every  1 1 M m ∈ , 
    1 1 1
* ˆ ) ˆ , ( m m m x = −  if  ) ˆ (
*
1 m x m = , 
and 
    1 1 1
* ) ˆ , ( m m m x = −  if  } ˆ ), ˆ ( { 1
*
1 m m x m ∉ . 
Hence, from property (ii), it must hold that 
1 * ) ˆ ( a m x = , and therefore, 
* 1 a a ≠ . This 
implies 
*
1 ˆ a m = , because if 
*
1 ˆ a m ≠ , then every agent  } 1 /{ N i∈  who announces 
1 ˆ ˆ m mi =  has incentive to announce 
* a  instead of  1 ˆ m . Note that for every  } 1 /{ N i∈ , if 
1 ˆ a mi = , then 
* * * ) ˆ , ( a m m x i i = − . 
It follows from property (iii) that there exists an agent  } 1 /{ N i∈  such  that 
1 ˆ a mi =  and 
i i i c a v a v − > ) ( ) (
1 * . 
Hence, this agent has incentive to announce 
* a  instead  of 
1 a , because 
) ˆ , ), ˆ , ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆ ), ˆ ( (
* * * * 1 *
i i i i i i i i i m m m m x u a v c a v m m x u − − = < − = .   11
This contradicts the Nash equilibrium property. 
  Finally, suppose that the above two suppositions do not hold. Then, it must be that 
1
* ˆ ) ˆ ( m m x = , 
and 
1 1 1
* ) ˆ , ( m m m x = −  for  all  1 1 M m ∈ , 
and therefore, 
   
1
1
* ˆ ) ˆ ( a m m x = =  
hold. Note that for every  } 1 /{ N i∈ , 
either 
1 * * ) ˆ , ( a m m x i i = −  or 
* * * ) ˆ , ( a m m x i i = − . 
It follows from properties (i) and (iii) that there exists an agent  } 1 /{ N i∈  who  announces 
* ˆ a mi ≠   but has incentive to announce 
* a , where 
    i i i i c a v m m x u − = ) ( ) ˆ ), ˆ ( (
1 *  
) ˆ , ), ˆ , ( ( )] ( ), ( min[
* * * * 1
i i i i i i i m m m m x u a v a v − − ≤ < . 
This contradicts the Nash equilibrium property. 
  Hence, we have proved that any alternative  A a ∈
*  is implemented in Nash 
equilibrium by 
* G  with  respect  to  all  ) (
* * a U u∈ . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 1 does not much depend on the assumption that all alternatives are 
describable and enforceable. We only need the socially optimal alternative 
* a , the status 
quo alternative a , and agent 1’s most favorite alternative 
1 a  to be describable and 
enforceable. When agents could announce a message profile  M m∈  in 
* G , the 
alternative  i m  for each  N i∈  must be describable, and therefore, any alternative in the 
support of  ) (
* m x  is describable, because  0 ) )( (
* > a m x  only if  } ,..., , , { 1
1
n m m a a a∈ . If 
an element of the support of  ) (
* m x  is not enforceable, then we may have to modify 
* G  
by replacing it with another enforceable alternative such as  a , but this modification does 
not change the essence of the proof of Theorem 1. 
  The requirement implied by property (iii) that the socially optimal alternative is 
preferred to agent 1’s most favorite by a majority of agents may be restrictive. In the next 
two sections, we will exclude this restriction and show more powerful possibility results 
than Theorem 1 by allowing small fines and multiple announcements. 
   12
4. Multiple Recommendations with Small Fines and 
Single Minimal Moralist 
 
We allow the central planner to require each agent except for agent 1 to announce 
multiple recommendations, and allow small fines. We assume that agent 1 has moral 
preference in a minimal sense that she prefers the announcement of the socially optimal 
alternative to any other announcement whenever the other agents announce only the 
socially optimal alternative. We will not require the other agents to have moral preference. 
We then show that there exists a mechanism that can implement any alternative in Nash 
equilibrium whenever agent 1 regards this alternative as being socially optimal. 
Assume that  4 = n ,
10  1 1 = K , and there exists a positive integer  0 > K  such that 
K K K K = = = 4 3 2 , i.e., 
A M = 1  and 
K A M M M = = = 4 3 2 . 
Hence, the central planner requires agent 1 to make a single announcement and the other 
agents to make  K   announcements each. For every  } ,..., 1 { K h∈ , let  ) , , ( 4 3 2
h h h h m m m m = . 
Choose  0 > ε   to be close to zero so that 
(1)     ε 3 1 > c . 
Fix a positive real number  0 > d  arbitrarily,  and  choose K   to be large so that 
(2)     i c d K + > ε  for  all  } 1 /{ N i∈ . 
Note that we can choose  ) , 0 ( ε ε ∈
+  to  satisfy 
(3)     i c d K + > +
+ ρ ε  for  all  } 1 /{ N i∈ , 
where we denote  0 > − =
+ ε ε ρ . 
We specify a mechanism  ) , ( ) , , (
+ + + + = = t x d K G G ε  as follows. Fix an alternative 
A a ∈  arbitrarily, which is regarded as the status quo alternative. We define  ∆ →
3 : A z  
as follows. For every 
3
3 2 1 ) , , ( A ∈ = δ δ δ δ , 
a z = ) (δ  if  a i = δ   for at least two components of  δ , 
and 
    a z = ) (δ  if  1 3 2 1 δ δ δ δ ≠ ≠ ≠ . 
Fix  M m∈  arbitrarily.  Let 










) (,  
where we regard  ) (δ z  as a simple lottery such that  1 ) )( ( = a z δ  if  a z = ) (δ . For every 
} ,..., 1 { K h∈ , with probability 
K
1
, the central planner will choose  ) (
h m z , where for every 
                                                 
10 This implies that there may exist five or more agents, but only four agents are required to 
participate in this decision procedure.   13
A a∈ , 
a m z
h = ) ( i f   a m
h
i =   for at least two agents  } 4 , 3 , 2 { ∈ i , 
and 
    a m z
h = ) ( i f  
h h h h m m m m 2 4 3 2 ≠ ≠ ≠ . 
Note that  ) (m x








) ( − − =
+ +   if there exists  } ,..., 1 { K h∈  such  that 
1 4 3 2 m m m m
h h h = = =














) ( − =
+  otherwise, 
where } ,..., 0 { ) ( K m qi ∈  is the number of agent  s i'  announcements that is not the same 
as agent 1’s announcement, i.e., 
} | } ,..., 1 { { ) ( 1 m m K h m q
h
i i ≠ ∈ = . 
Let 
    ∑
∈
+ + − =
} 1 /{
1 ) ( ) (
N i
i m t m t , 
and therefore, 




i m t  for all  M m∈ . Each agent 
} 4 , 3 , 2 { ∈ i  pays the monetary amount 
+ ε  to agent 1, in addition to  ρ
K
qi , if and only if 
she is the first agent(s) to make a different announcement from agent 1’s announcement.
11 
 For  every  A a ∈
*  and every positive real number  0 > d , we define  ) , (
* d a U
+  as 
the set of utility function profiles  u  satisfying  the  following three properties. 
 
(iv)   For  every  } 4 , 3 , 2 { ∈ i , every  A a∈ , and every  } /{a A a ∈ ′ , 
d a v a v i i ≤ ′ − ) ( ) ( . 
(v)   For  every  } /{
*
1 1 a M m ∈ , 
1 ) , (
*
1 1 1 = − m m r . 







) ( ≤ , 
where  ) (m wi   is the number of agent  s i'   announcements that is not the same as 
the socially optimal alternative, i.e., 
    } | } ,..., 1 { { ) (
* a m K h m w
h
i i i ≠ ∈ = . 
 
                                                 
11  We assume imperfect information.   14
Property (iv) implies that  d  is the upper bound of the utility differences for all agents 
except for agent 1. Property (v) implies that agent 1 has moral preference in the minimal 
sense that she prefers the announcement of the socially optimal alternative to any other 
announcement as long as the other agents recommend only the socially optimal alternative. 
Property (vi) allows each agent other than agent 1 to have no moral preference. 
 
Theorem 2: Suppose that inequalities (1) and (2) hold. Then, any alternative  A a ∈
*  is 
implemented in Nash equilibrium by  ) , , ( d K G ε
+   with respect to all  ) , (
* d a U u
+ ∈ . 
 
Proof: Note that 
   





+ m ti  for  all  N i∈ . 
Fix  A a∈  arbitrarily.  Fix  } ,..., 1 { K h∈  and  M m∈  arbitrarily,  where 





′  for  all  N i∈  and  all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ ′ h h . 
First, consider any agent  } 4 , 3 , 2 { ∈ i . Suppose  a m
h
i ≠ . Let  i i M m ∈ ′  be the message 
for agent  i defined  by 
a m
h






′ ′ = ′  for  all  } /{ } ,..., 1 { h K h ∈ ′ . 
If  a m
h
j =  for all  } , 1 /{ i N j∈ , then it follows that  ) (m x
+  is independent of 
h
i m  and 





m t m m t i i i i
ρ
, which implies that agent i has incentive to announce  i m′ 
instead of  i m . If  a m
h
j ≠  for  some  i j ≠ , then it follows that 
K
m t m m t i i i i
ρ
ε + = ′ − ′
+ +
−
+ ) ( ) , ( , which, together with properties (iv) and (vi) and the 
inequalities (3), implies that agent  i  has incentive to announce  i m′ instead  of  i m , where 
) , ), , ( ), , ( ( ) ), ( ), ( ( i i i i i i i i i i m m m m t m m x u m m t m x u − −
+
−
+ + + ′ ′ ′ −  
























Next, suppose that 
a m
h
i =  for  all  } 4 , 3 , 2 { ∈ i  and  all  } ,..., 1 { K h∈ , 
                                                 
12  This argument is related to Abreu and Matsushima (1992a, 1992b), which explored a similar idea 
of iterative removal of dominated strategies. We will use this idea also in the proofs of Theorems 3 
and 6.   15
and 
a m = 1 . 
If 
* a a ≠ , then 











+ m x v m m m m t m m x u  
    ) ), ( ), ( ( )) ( ( 1 1 1 m m t m x u m x v
+ + + ≥ > , 
which implies that agent 1 does not have incentive to announce  a m = 1 . If 
* a a = , then 
*
1 1 m m = , and therefore, it follows from inequality (1) that for every  } /{
*
1 1 a M m ∈ ′ , 
    ) ) ( ( ) ), ( ), ( ( 1 1 1 m x v m m t m x u
+ + + =  
    ) , ), , ( ), , ( ( 3 )) ( ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 − −
+
−
+ + ′ ′ ′ = − + > m m m m t m m x u c m x v ε , 
which implies that agent 1 has incentive to announce 
*
1 a m = . 
The above arguments imply that 
* m  is the unique Nash equilibrium in  ) , ( u G
+ . 
Hence, we have proved that any alternative  A a ∈
*  is implemented in Nash equilibrium 
by 
+ G   with respect to all  ) , (
* d a U u
+ ∈ . 
Q.E.D. 
 
  The logical core of Theorem 2 is as follows. Since no agents other than agent 1 want 
to be the first deviant(s), they have incentive to announce only the same recommendation as 
agent 1’s. Agent 1, however, can receive the monetary gain  0 3 > ε  by announcing 
differently from the other agents’ recommendations. This interrupts any message profile 
other than 
* m   from being a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, agent 1 has no incentive 
to deviate from 
* m , because she can save the psychological cost  1 c  for  immorality,  which 
is greater than the monetary gain  ε 3 . This is why 
* m  is the unique pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium in 
+ G . 
Theorem 2 does not much depend on the assumption that the set of alternatives is 
describable and enforceable. We only need 
* a  and a   to be describable and enforceable, 
which is weaker than the mechanism 
* G  in Section 3. Hence, from the viewpoint of 
contractual incompleteness, the mechanisms with small fines and multiple announcements 
may have advantage over the mechanism with no fine and single announcements. 
We can check that 
* m  is the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in  ) , ( u G
+  
with a refinement device that agent 1 never announces any message  1 m  that is weakly 
dominated by 
*
1 m   in that for every  1 1 − − ∈M m , 











+ ≥ , 
and the strict inequality holds for some  1 1 − − ∈M m . In fact, every  } /{
*
1 1 1 m M m ∈  is 
weakly dominated by 
*
1 m , because for every  1 1 − − ∈M m , 











+ ≥ , 
and the strict inequality holds for 
*
1 1 − − = m m . Hence, agent 1 will announce only 
*
1 m  in 
this case. Since 
* m   is the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where agent 1 chooses   16
*
1 m , we have proved that 
* m  is the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with the 
above refinement device. 
There, however, may exist unwanted mixed strategy Nash equilibria in the game 
) , ( u G
+ , where with positive probability agent 1 announces messages that are weakly 
dominated by 
*
1 m . In the next section, we will show the possibility that any alternative is 
implementable even in terms of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 
The result of this section holds even if no agent has moral preference. Suppose that for 
every  } /{
* a A a∈ , 
    ) , , ( max ) , ( 3 1 1 1 1
1
− ≠ ′
′ − > m m a u m a u
a m ε , 
and 










− ≠ ′ −
≠ ′
′ − > ′ − m m a u m a u m m a u m a u
a m a m
. 
Hence, agent 1’s gain from the same announcement as the other agents’ common immoral 
announcements is less than  ε 3 . It is also less than agent 1’s gain from the moral 
announcement when the other agents make the honest announcements. Here, we do not 
require agent 1 to prefer the moral announcement the most. Modify 
+
1 t   in ways that agent 
1 receives from the first deviants a value between 
3










′ − m m a u m a u
a m  and 
3
) , , ( max ) , ( 1 1 1 1
1
− ≠ ′
′ − m m a u m a u
a m  instead  of 
+ ε . In the same ways as Theorem 2, we can check 
that 
* a   is implemented in Nash equilibrium by this modified mechanism. 
   17
5. Iterative Dominance 
 
This section shows that there exists a mechanism with small fines that can implement 
any alternative in iterative dominance, and therefore in mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, 
whenever agent 1 regards this alternative as being socially optimal and has moral 
preference in the original sense. Here, the other agents are not required to have moral 
preferences. This section assumes that  3 = n ,
13  and there exists a positive integer  K  such 




K A M  and 
K A M M = = 3 2 . 
Hence, the central planner requires agent 1 to make  1 + K  announcements and the other 
agents to make  K   announcements each. For every  } ,..., 1 { K h∈ , let  ) , , ( 3 2 1
h h h h m m m m = . 
Fix positive real numbers  0 > ε  and  0 > d  arbitrarily. Choose K  to be large so 
that 
(4)     d K > ε . 
Note that we can choose  ) , 0 ( ε ε ∈
+ +  to  satisfy 
(5)     d K > +
+ + ρ ε , 
where we denote  0 > − =
+ + ε ε ρ . 
We specify a mechanism  ) , ( ) , , (
+ + + + + + + + = = t x d K G G ε  as follows. Fix  M m∈  
arbitrarily. Let 







= + + =
1
) (
) (.  
For every  } ,..., 1 { K h∈ , with probability 
K
1
, the central planner will choose  ) (
h m z , 
where for every  A a∈ , 
a m z
h = ) (   if there exist at least two agents  } 3 , 2 , 1 { ∈ i  such  that  a m
h
i = , 
and 
    a m z
h = ) ( i f  
h h h h m m m m 1 3 2 1 ≠ ≠ ≠ . 
Note that  ) (m x
+ +   does not depend on 
1
1








) ( − − =
+ + + +  if  there  exists  } ,..., 1 { K h∈  such  that 
1
1 3 2 1
+ ′ ′ ′ = = =














) ( − =
+ +  otherwise. 
                                                 
13 This implies that there may exist four or more agents but only three agents are required to 
participate in this decision procedure.   18
Each agent  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i  is fined the monetary amount 
+ + ε , in addition to  ρ
K
m qi ) (
, if and 
only if she is the first agent to announce differently from agent 1’s  th K − + ) 1 (  
announcement. Let 
    0 ) ( 1 =
+ + m t  for  all  M m∈ . 
Hence, agent 1 is never fined or rewarded. 
 For  every  A a ∈
*  and every  0 > d , we define  ) , (
* d a U
+ +  as the set of utility 
function profiles  u   satisfying the following two properties. 
 
(vii)   For every  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i , every  A a∈ , and every  } /{a A a ∈ ′ , 
d a v a v i i ≤ ′ − ) ( ) ( . 









m r , 
where  } | } ,..., 1 { { ) (
*
1 1 1 a m K h m w
h ≠ ∈ = . 
 
Property (vii) implies that  d  is the upper bound of the utility differences for all agents 
except for agent 1. Property (viii) implies that agent 1 always prefers the announcement of 
the socially optimal alternative to any other announcement. Note that for every  A a∈ , 
every  R ti ∈ , and every  M m∈ , 
1
1
1 1 1 1 1
) (
) ( ) , , ( c
K
m w
t a v m t a u
+
− + = . 
We do not require each agent other than agent 1 to have moral preference. 
 
Theorem 3:  Suppose that inequality (4) holds. Then, any alternative  A a ∈
*  is 
implemented in iterative dominance by  ) , , ( d K G ε
+ +   with respect to all  ) , (
* d a U u
+ + ∈ . 
 
Proof: Note that 
   
* *) ( a m x =




+ + m ti  for  all  N i∈ . 




+ , because both  ) (m x
+ +  and  ) ( 1 m t




+ K m   and because of property (viii). 









′  for  all  N i∈  and  all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ ′ h h .   19
First, consider any agent  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i . Suppose 
* a m
h
i ≠ . Let  i i M m ∈ ′  be the message 
for agent  i defined  by 
* a m
h










j =  for all  } /{i N j∈ , then, it follows that  ) (m x
+ +  is independent of 
h
i m  and 





m t m m t i i i i
ρ
, which implies that agent  i has incentive to announce  i m′ 
instead of  i m . If 
* a m
h
j ≠  for  some  i j ≠ , then it follows that 
K
m t m m t i i i i
ρ
ε + = − ′
+ + + +
−
+ + ) ( ) , ( , which, together with property (vii) and inequality (5), 
implies that agent  i  has incentive to announce  i m′ instead  of  i m , where 
) , ), , ( ), , ( ( ) ), ( ), ( ( i i i i i i i i i i m m m m t m m x u m m t m x u − −
+
−
+ + + ′ ′ ′ −  
0 ))} , ( ( ) ( {
1

















Next, suppose that 
* a m
h




h ≠ . 
Let  1 1 M m ∈ ′   be the message for agent 1 defined by 
*
1 a m
h = ′ , 
and 
h h m m
′ ′ = ′ 1 1  for  all  } /{ } ,..., 1 { h K h ∈ ′ . 
Note that  ) (m x
+ +  is independent of 
h m1  and  0 ) ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 = = ′
+ +
−
+ + m t m m t , which, together 
with property (viii), implies that agent 1 has incentive to announce  1 m′ instead  of  1 m . 
The above arguments imply that 
* m  is the unique iteratively undominated message 
profile in  ) , ( u G
+ + . Hence, we have proved that any alternative  A a ∈
*   is implemented in 
iterative dominance by 
+ + G  with  respect  to  all  ) , (
* d a U u
+ + ∈ . 
Q.E.D. 
 
  The logical core of the proof of Theorem 3 is as follows. Since 
1
1
+ K m  does not 
influence ) (m x
+ +  and  ) ( 1 m t
+ + , it follows from moral preference that agent 1 always 




+ . In the same way as the idea of iterative removal of 
undominated strategies originated in Abreu and Matsushima (1992b), every agent dislikes 
to announce differently from 
1
1
+ K m . 
In contrast with Theorems 1 and 2, we do not need any restriction on the sizes of the   20
costs 0 > i c  such as properties (ii) and (iii) and inequalities (1) and (2). This implies that 
the same mechanism 
+ + G   works for any specification of  N i i c ∈ ) ( . 
  Theorem 3 does not much depend on the assumption that the set of alternatives is 
describable and enforceable. In the same way as the mechanism 
+ G  in Section 4, we can 
check that we only need 
* a  and a   to be describable and enforceable. 
   21
6. Implementation of Social Choice Functions 
 
We will show that each of the mechanisms 
* G , 
+ G , and 
+ + G  can  implement  a  wide 
variety of social choice functions. We do not require the set of states to be describable. The 
mechanisms do not depend on the detail of a particular model specification such as the set 
of states and the social choice function. Let  Ω denote the set of states. A social choice 
function  A f → Ω :  is defined as a mapping from states to alternatives. Let  F  denote 
the set of social choice functions. A state-contingent utility function profile is given by 
Ω ∈ = ω
ω µ ) (u , where  N i i u u ∈ = ) (
ω ω  and  R M R A ui → × × :
ω . A social choice function  f  
is said to be implemented in Nash equilibrium (iterative dominance) by a mechanism  G  
with respect to a state-contingent utility function profile  µ  if  for  every  Ω ∈ ω ,  ) (ω f  is 
implemented in Nash equilibrium (iterative dominance, respectively) by  G  with respect 
to 
ω u . 
Subsection 6.1 will show that a wide variety of social choice functions are 
implementable even if the set of states are indescribable. Subsection 6.2 will show that 
whenever a single mechanism can implement multiple social choice functions, agents’ 
preferences must depend on the social choice function. Moral preference is regarded as a 





* G , 
+ G , and 
+ + G  do not depend on how the set of states and the 
social choice function are to be specified. These mechanisms each, nevertheless, can 
implement a wide variety of social choice functions. The following theorem is 
straightforward from Theorems 1, 2, and 3. 
 
Theorem 4: Suppose that  5 ≥ n ,  n is odd, and  A M i =  for all  N i∈ . Then, a social 
choice function  f   is implemented in Nash equilibrium by 
* G  with  respect  to µ  if 
)) ( (
* ω
ω f U u ∈  for  all  Ω ∈ ω . 
Suppose that  4 = n ,  1 1 = K , and there exists a positive integer K  such  that 
K A M M M = = = 4 3 2 . Then, a social choice function  f  is implemented in Nash 
equilibrium by 
+ G  with  respect  to µ  if 
) ), ( ( d f U u ω
ω + ∈  for  all  Ω ∈ ω . 




K A M  and 
K A M M = = 3 2 . Then, a social choice function  f  is implemented in iterative dominance 
by 
+ + G   with respect to  µ  if 
) ), ( ( d f U u ω
ω + + ∈  for  all  Ω ∈ ω . 
 
Theorem 4 implies that even if the set of states is indescribable, a wide variety of   22
social choice functions are implementable. Theorem 4 does not much depend on the 
describability and enforceability of alternatives. In order for 
* G  to work, we only need 
that at every state  Ω ∈ ω ,  ) (ω f ,  a , and agent 1’s most favorite alternative  ) (
1 1 ω a a = , 
which may depend on the state, are describable and enforceable. In order for 
+ G  and 
+ + G  
to work, we only need that at every state  Ω ∈ ω ,  ) (ω f  and a  are describable and 
enforceable. 
 
6.2. Dependence of Preferences on Social Choice Function 
 
This subsection will allow the set of states and the social choice function to be 
describable, and therefore allow a mechanism to depend on the set of states  Ω and the 
social choice function  f . A subset of social choice functions is denoted by  F F ⊂
~
. Fix a 
set of message profiles M  arbitrarily.  Let  F f
f
~ ) ( ∈ µ   denote a collection of 
state-contingent utility function profiles, where  Ω ∈ = ω
ω µ ) (
, f f u  and  N i
f
i
f u u ∈ = ) (
, , ω ω .  A 
subset of social choice functions  F F ⊂
~
 is said to be implemented in Nash equilibrium 
(iterative dominance) by a mechanism G  with respect to  F f
f
~ ) ( ∈ µ   if every  F f
~
∈  is 
implemented in Nash equilibrium (iterative dominance, respectively) by  G  with respect 
to 
f µ . 
Note that there exist no subset of social choice functions  F F ⊂
~
 that is not a 
singleton, no collection of state-contingent utility function profiles  F f
f
~ ) ( ∈ µ  that is 
constant with respect to  f , and no mechanism G  that implements  F
~
 in Nash 
equilibrium with respect to 
F f
f
~ ) ( ∈ µ . This implies that in order for a single mechanism to 
implement any subset of social choice function that is not a singleton, the state-contingent 
utility function profile must depend on the social choice function. This result hold true 











i M m m
i ∈ = =1
, , , ) (





i =  for  all  } ,..., 1 { i K h∈ . 
The following theorem is straightforward from Theorem 4. 
 
Theorem 5: Suppose that  5 ≥ n ,  n  is odd, and  A Mi =  for  all  N i∈ . Then,  F F ⊂
~
 is 
implemented in Nash equilibrium by 
* G  with  respect  to  F f
f
~ ) ( ∈ µ  if 
)) ( (
* , ω
ω f U u
f ∈  for  all  F f
~
∈  and  all  Ω ∈ ω . 
Suppose that  4 = n ,  1 1 = K , and there exists a positive integer K  such  that   23
K A M M M = = = 4 3 2 . Then,  F F ⊂
~
 is implemented in Nash equilibrium by 





∈ µ  if 
) ), ( (
, d f U u
f ω
ω + ∈  for  all  F f
~
∈  and  Ω ∈ ω . 




K A M  and 
K A M M = = 3 2 . Then,  F F ⊂
~
 is implemented in iterative dominance by 
+ + G  with 
respect to  F f
f
~ ) ( ∈ µ  if 
) ), ( ( d f U u ω
ω + + ∈  for  all  F f
~
∈  and  all  Ω ∈ ω . 
 
  Note that moral preferences are regarded as a special case of the dependence that 
agents’ preferences depend on the social choice function. Theorem 5 implies that when 
agents’ preferences depend on the social choice function in this way, a single mechanism 
can implement a wide variety of social choice functions.   24
7. Incomplete Information 
 
This section investigates the incomplete information environments. We assume  2 ≥ n . 
Each agent receives her private signal denoted by  i ω . Let  i Ω  denote the set of private 




i . Let  ] 1 , 0 [ : → Ψ p  denote a probability measure 
on  ) , ( Ψ Ω  where Ψ  is a  − σ field. Let  P  denote the set of probability measures. A 
message rule for each agent  N i∈   is defined as a function  i i i M → Ω : η . Let  i Ξ  denote 





i ,  N i i i ∈ = )) ( ( ) ( ω η ω η , and  } /{ )) ( ( ) ( i N j j j i i ∈ − − = ω η ω η . 
Let  i
p G
i Ξ = Ξ






p G ) , , , 0 ( ) , , , 0 ( µ µ . Recursively, for every  ,... 2 , 1 = r , let 
) , , , ( µ p G r
i Ξ   denote the set of message rules 
) , , , 1 ( µ η
p G r
i i
− Ξ ∈  for  each agent i such  that  there 
exist no  i i M m ∈  and  no  i i Ω ∈ ω   satisfying that for every 




− − Ξ ∈ , 
] , | )) ( )), ( ( )), ( ( ( [ i i i p x g u E ω ω η ω η ω η
ω  
] , | )) ( , )), ( , ( )), ( , ( ( [ i i i i i i i i i i i i p m m x m g u E ω ω η ω η ω η
ω




− Ξ = Ξ
} /{






µ µ , and  ] , | [ i p E ω ⋅  implies the expected value conditional 







p G r ) , , , ( ) , , , ( µ µ  and  I
∞
=
∞ Ξ = Ξ
0
) , , , ( ) , , , (
r
p G r p G µ µ . A message rule profile  Ξ ∈ η  is  said 
to be iteratively undominated in the Bayesian game defined by  ) , , ( µ p G  if 
) , , , ( µ η
p G ∞ Ξ ∈ . 
A social choice function  F f ∈  is said to be implemented in iterative dominance by a 
Bayesian game  ) , , ( µ p G  if there exists the unique iteratively undominated message rule 
profile  η in  ) , , ( µ p G , and this message rule profile satisfies that for every  Ω ∈ ω , 
    ) ( )) ( ( ω ω η f g = , and  0 )) ( ( = ω η i x  for  all  N i∈ . 
Note that if η  is the unique iteratively undominated message rule profile, then it is the 
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
Let  i A  denote the set of possible characteristics of the socially optimal alternative 




i N i i A a ) (  




i A A  and  N i i a a ∈ = ) ( . Hence, a social 
choice function  f   is decomposable in the sense that there exists  N i i f ∈ ) (  such  that 
i i i A f → Ω :  for  all  N i∈ , 
and 
    N i i i f f ∈ = )) ( ( ) ( ω ω  for  all  Ω ∈ ω .   25
We assume that there exists a positive integer  0 > K  such  that 
  
K
i i A M =  for  all  N i∈ . 
Each agent  N i∈  makes K  announcements about what the characteristic of the socially 
optimal alternative that she knows is. Let 
K
i i i M M M × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × =
1  where  i
k
i A M = . Let η ˆ 
denote the moral message rule profile such that for every  N i∈ , 
) ( ) ( ˆ i i i
k
i f ω ω η =  for  all  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈  and  all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
Fix a positive real number  0 > d  and a positive integer  } 1 ,..., 1 { ˆ − ∈ K K  arbitrarily, and 
choose  0 > ε   to be close to zero so that 
(6)     ε > i c
K
K ˆ
 for  all  N i∈ , 
and 
(7)     d K K > − ε ) ˆ (.  













+ = , 
where we regard  ) (ω f  as the simple lottery such that  1 ) )( ( = a f ω  if  a f = ) (ω . For 




, the central planner will choose  ) (
k m f . 
Note that  ) ( ˆ m x  does not depend on agents’ first  K ˆ  announcements  ) ,..., (
ˆ 1 K m m . This 
independence will play an important role in establishing a reference point to check whether 
each agent made the moral announcements or not in the incomplete information 
environments. 
For every  N i∈  and  every  M m∈ , 




i m m ≠ , and 
1 m m
h =  
for all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k h . 
and 
0 ) ( ˆ = m ti   if there exists no such  k . 
Each agent  N i∈  is fined if and only if she is the first agent whose announcement is 
inconsistent with her first announcement. 
When the agents announce the moral message profile  ) ( ˆ ω η , the central planner will 
choose  ) (ω f   and no agents are fined, i.e., for every  Ω ∈ ω , 
) ( )) ( ˆ ( ˆ ω ω η f x = , and  0 )) ( ˆ ( ˆ = ω η i t  for  all  N i∈ . 
We shall confine our attentions to state-dependent utility function profiles 
Ω ∈ = ω
ω µ ) (u  such  that 
    d a v a v i i
N A i a a
≤ ′ −
× Ω × ∈ ′
) , ( ) , ( max
2 ) , , , (
ω ω
ω
,   26
and every agent  i has moral preference in the sense that she has a positive psychological 
cost  0 >
K
ci  for announcing any characteristic other than  ) ( i i f ω , i.e., for every  Ω ∈ ω , 
every  ] 0 , [ ) , ( ε − × ∈ A t a i , and every  M m∈ , 
i
i i i i
i i i i c
K
f m q
t a v m t a u
)) ( , (
) , ( ) , , (
ω
ω
ω − + = , 
where  } ,..., 0 { ) , ( K a m q i i i ∈  denotes the number of  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈  satisfying  i
k
i a m ≠ . Let 
) (d W   denote the set of all such state-dependent utility function profiles. 
  Note that the mechanism  G ˆ   is not tailored to a particular model specification. In fact, 
it is independent of the probability structure, as well as of the preference structure, the set 
of states, and the social choice function, as mentioned before. 
 
Theorem 6: Suppose that inequalities (6) and (7) hold. Then, For every  P p∈  and  every 
) (d W ∈ µ , any social choice function  F f ∈  is implemented in iterative dominance by 
) , , ˆ ( µ p G  if  for  every  N i∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  i i Ω ∈ ′ ω , 
(8)     i i i i i i i c
K
K K
p f v E p f v E
) ˆ (
] , | ) ), , ( ( [ ] , | ) ), ( ( [
−
− ′ ≥ − ω ω ω ω ω ω ω . 
 
Proof: Fix  Ξ ∈ η  and  N i∈  arbitrarily.  Fix  Ω ∈ ω  arbitrarily.  Suppose  that 






j ω η ω η
− ≠  for  some  } /{i N j∈  and  some  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈ . 
Then, agent  i  is never fined whenever she announces 
) ( i i
k
i f m ω =  for  all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ . 
Next, suppose that 






j ω η ω η
− =  for  all  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈  and  all  N j∈ . 
If  ) ( ) ( i i i
k
i f ω ω η ≠  for  all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ , then, by announcing  ) ( i i
k
i f m ω =  for  all 
} ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈  instead, agent i can save the amount  c
K
K ˆ
 of her psychological cost. This 
amount is greater than the monetary fine ε , because of inequality (6). If 






i ω η ω η
− ≠  for some  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈ , then the central planner will fine agent i. 
Since she has moral preference and her first K ˆ  announcements do not influence the 
central planner’s alternative choice, the above arguments imply that agent  i is willing to 












1 )) ( ˆ ( = ω η . Hence, we have proved that for every  N i∈ , if  i η   is iteratively undominated, 




i η η ˆ =  for  all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ .   27




j η η ˆ =  for  all  N j∈  and  all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k k . 
Fix  i i Ω ∈ ω  arbitrarily, and suppose that  ) ( ) ( i i i
k
i f ω ω η ≠ . Let  i i M m ∈  denote the 
message for agent  i defined  by 










i m ω η =  for  all  } ,..., 1 { K k k + ∈ . 
Suppose that  ) ( ) ( j i j
k
j f ω ω η ≠  for  some  } /{i N j∈ . Then, 
    ε ω η − = )) ( ( ˆ
i t  and  0 )) ( , ( ˆ = − − i i i i m t ω η . 
Inequality (7) implies that the expected value of utility difference for alternative between 
the messages  ) ( i i ω η  and  i m  is less than  ε . Hence, agent  i strictly  prefers announcing 
i m  instead  of  ) ( i i ω η . 
Next, suppose that  ) ( ) ( j j j
k
j f ω ω η =  for  all  } /{i N j∈ . Then, 
ε ω η − = )) ( ( ˆ
i t  and  ε ω η − ≥ − − )) ( , ( ˆ
i i i i m t . 
Inequality (8), together with moral preference, implies that agent  i has strict incentive to 
make the moral announcement when the other agents make the moral announcements. 
Hence, agent  i  strictly prefers to announce  i m  instead  of  ) ( i i ω η . 
From the above arguments, we have proved that if η is an iteratively undominated 
message rule profile, then  η η ˆ =  must hold. Since the set of iteratively undominated 
message rule profiles 
) , , , ( µ p G ∞ Ξ   is nonempty, we have completed the proof of Theorem 6. 
Q.E.D. 
 




 is as close to zero as possible. Hence, it follows from Theorem 6 that for 
every  P p∈  and every  ) (d W ∈ µ , every social choice function  F f ∈  is implemented 
in iterative dominance by  G ˆ   if for every  N i∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  i i Ω ∈ ′ ω , 
i i i i i i i c p f v E p f v E − ′ ≥ − ] , | ) ), , ( ( [ ] , | ) ), ( ( [ ω ω ω ω ω ω ω . 
  We do not need the set of alternatives to be describable. When agents could announce 
a message profile  M m∈ , the alternative given by 
h m  for each  } ,..., 1 { K h∈  must be 
describable, and therefore, any alternative in the support of  ) ( ˆ m x  is describable, because 
whenever  0 ) )( ( ˆ > a m x  then 
h m a =  for some  } ,..., 1 ˆ { K K h + ∈ . Hence, we only need 
that at every state  Ω ∈ ω , the value of the social choice function  ) (ω f  is describable, 
provided that any describable alternative is enforceable. If some describable alternatives are 
not enforceable, then we may have to modify the incentive compatibility condition by   28
replacing it with any describable alternative such as the status quo alternative  a . 
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